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EU COOPERATION WITH REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN AFRICA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As neighbours, Europe and Africa share a long history that extends far beyond the origins of 
the regional integration processes on either continent. Over the past century, the relationships 
between Europe and Africa have gradually shifted from those between colonizers and 
colonized, to donor-recipient relations and more recently to an increasingly multilateral 
‘partnership of equals’. Although the European Union (EU) recognized the importance of Africa 
for Europe early on, its Africa policy remained fragmented. It was only in the early 2000s that 
a confluence of global and regional developments brought about a profound shift in EU-Africa 
relations towards a more multilateral, continent-to-continent approach. The adoption of the 
Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) in 2007 marked a turning point in this respect, laying the 
corner stone for a strategic partnership between equal partners. It provides both sides with an 
overarching, long-term strategic framework, identifying priority areas and establishing a 
complex web of inter-institutional engagement between EU and African Union (AU) actors, 
member states and civil society. Today, the EU and its regional counterparts in Africa 
(including the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)) cooperate on a broad 
range of issues ranging from peace and security, to democracy and human rights, trade, 
development, energy, climate change and the environment, migration, science and the 
information society. However, it should be noted that the ‘partnership of equals’ is often more 
rhetorical than real as the EU continues to dominate agenda setting and negotiations. 
This paper sketches EU-Africa interregional relations, starting with a brief history of EU-Africa 
relations (2.) and an overview of the different regional integration frameworks in Africa (3.). It 
maps the legal and institutional framework of the EU’s cooperation with the AU and the 
different RECs (4.) and examines the policy framework of the strategic partnership (5.). 
Subsequently the tools for cooperation are examined, with a focus on political dialogue, trade 
and investment, and financing (6.) before we analyse the opportunities and challenges of EU-
African cooperation (7.). 
2. FROM COLONIALISM TO PARTNERSHIP: THE EVOLUTION OF EU-AFRICA RELATIONS 
From the beginning, Africa has held a special place in EU foreign relations.1 Instead of 
pursuing a comprehensive intercontinental approach, however, EU Africa policy quickly 
fragmented into parallel frameworks – for sub-Saharan and Northern Africa respectively – 
which co-exist until today. 
Initially, relations between the European Economic Community (EEC) and overseas colonial 
countries and territories (most of which were African) were governed by the Rome Treaty, 
which provided for the association of these territories with the EEC in order to promote 
economic and social development and establish closer economic ties.2 However, the newly 
gained independence of several of these former colonies in the late 1950s and 1960s 
necessitated a new, treaty-based framework for cooperation.  
                                               
1 See for a brief introduction Conrad Rein, ‘The European Union and the African Union: A Strategic Partnership?’ 
(2015) 20(4) European Foreign Affairs Review 553. 
2 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (adopted 25 March 1957, entry into force 1 January 
1958) art 131-136. 
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In 1963, the EEC and 18 sub-Saharan African states signed the Yaoundé Convention,3 
followed by the Yaoundé II-Convention4 and the Arusha Convention in 1969.5 The 
Conventions focused on trade and financial and technical coordination and still largely retained 
the hierarchical relationship of the past.6 In 1975 this first generation of treaties was replaced 
by the Lomé Convention,7 with the newly formed African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of 
States (ACP), mainly made up of former colonies of the EEC member states which one of the 
major colonial powers, the United Kingdom, had joined in 1973. After four revisions,8 the 
changing international environment9 led to a profound shift in the EU-ACP cooperation 
framework and the adoption of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement in 2000.10 After an initially 
exclusive focus on trade and development, EU-ACP relations have included a political 
dimension since Lomé IV (1990) with the launch of a political dialogue and a stronger focus 
on the respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law.11 Since 2002, the EU has 
been negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with regional groupings of ACP 
states, which will ultimately replace the trade regime under the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement.12  
EU relations with Northern Africa followed a different path.13 Early Association Agreements 
were concluded with Morocco and Tunisia in 1969,14 aiming at trade liberalization. After the 
launch of the Global Mediterranean Policy of the EEC in 1972, a second generation of 
Cooperation Agreements followed, this time including provisions on financial and technical 
                                               
3 Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and Associated African States, with 
related Agreements (adopted 20 July 1963, entry into force 1 June 1964) 2 ILM 971. 
4 Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and the African States and Madagascar 
associated with the Community (adopted 29 July 1969, entry into force 1 January 1971). 
5 Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and the United Republic of 
Tanzania, the Republic of Uganda and the Republic of Kenya (adopted 24 September 1969, entry into force 1 
January 1971). 
6 Annemarie Peen Rodt and Jide Martyns Okeke, ‘AU-EU "Strategic Partnership": Strengthening Policy 
Convergence and Regime Efficacy in the African Peace and Security Complex?’ (2013) 6 African Security 211 
(215). 
7 EEC-ACP Convention of Lomé (adopted 28 February 1975, entry into force 1 April 1976) 14 ILM 604.  
8 Second ACP-EEC Convention (adopted 31 October 1978, entry into force 1 January 1981, 19 ILM 327 [1980] OJ 
L347/2) [Lomé II], Third ACP-EEC Convention (adopted 8 December 1984, entry into force 1 May 1986, 24 ILM 
588 [1986] OJ L86/3) [Lomé III], Fourth ACP-EEC Convention (adopted 15 December 1989, entry into force 1 
March 1990, 29 ILM 783 [1991] OJ L229/3) [Lomé IV], and Agreement amending the fourth ACP-EC Convention 
of Lomé (adopted 4 November 1995, entered into force 1 June 1998) [1998] OJ L156/3 [Lomé IV-bis]. 
9 Maurizio Carbone, ‘EU-Africa relations in the twenty-first century: evolution and explanations’ in Maurizio Carbone 
(ed), The European Union in Africa: Incoherent policies, asymmetrical partnership, declining relevance? 
(Manchester University Press 2013) 4. 
10 Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one 
part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 
(adopted 23 June 2000, entry into force 1 April 2003), [2010] OJ L317/3 [Cotonou Partnership Agreement]. The 
Cotonou Agreement was revised twice: in 2005 (Agreement amending the Partnership Agreement between the 
Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one Part, and the European Community 
and its Member States, of the other Part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (adopted 25 June 2005, entry into 
force 1 July 2008) [2005] OJ L209/27) and in 2010 (Agreement amending for the Second Time the Partnership 
Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one Part, and the 
European Community and its Member States, of the other Part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, as first 
amended in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005 (adopted 22 June 2010, entry into force 1 April 2017) [2010] OJ L287/3). 
11 The Lomé III Convention contained first references to human rights, though only in the preamble and annexes. 
It was only with the Lomé IV Convention that human rights provisions entered the main text of the Convention, see 
Lomé IV Convention (n 8) art 5.  
12 For an overview of the state of play see: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/144912.htm> accessed 22 
January 2018. See also infra, section 6.2. 
13 For a detailed analysis see Peter Van Elsuwege, ‘Regional Co-operation in Europe: the European 
Neighbourhood and Regional Processes, and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED)’ in: Ramses A. 
Wessel and Jed Odermatt (eds) Research Handbook on the European Union’s Engagement with International 
Organisations (Edward Elgar 2018), forthcoming. 
14 Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of 
Morocco (adopted 31 March 1969, entry into force 1 September 1969) [1969] OJ L197/3 (in French); Agreement 
establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Tunisia (adopted 28 
March 1969, entry into force 1 September 1969) [1969] OJ L198/3 (in French). 
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cooperation.15 The establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (EuroMed) in 1995 
marked a turning point in the EU’s relations with Northern Africa.16 It established a multilateral 
cooperation framework (the so called Barcelona Process) between the EU and 12 non-EU 
Mediterranean countries, in the areas of politics and security, economics and finances, as well 
as social and cultural matters. Under this framework, a third generation of bilateral agreements 
between the EU and four Northern African countries was concluded, mirroring the ‘basket’ 
structure of the EuroMed.17 In addition, since 2004, Northern African countries also fall under 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched by the EU in order to provide a new 
framework with the countries beyond its Eastern and Southern borders. However, although 
both policy frameworks overlap considerably, it was emphasized that the ENP was not 
intended to replace EuroMed, but rather to complement it and offer additional instruments.18 
Finally, 2008 saw the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean, an intergovernmental 
organization, which is essentially a relaunch of EuroMed,19 though with important changes in 
membership,20 institutionalization and functioning.21 
African regional integration has slowly begun to play an increasing role in these cooperation 
frameworks. While involvement of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the early 
Yaoundé Conventions was still minimal,22 it actively participated in the negotiations of the 
subsequent Lomé Convention.23 Today, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, as amended in 
2010, explicitly recognizes the African Union (AU) as an actor of cooperation and as a partner 
for political dialogue, and emphasizes its role for peace building and conflict prevention in the 
region.24 The AU has also become eligible for ACP funding from the European Development 
Fund (EDF) since Article 30 of the Cotonou Agreement provides for capacity building of 
regional integration organizations set up by ACP states.25 On the other hand, the AU is not 
actively engaged in the frameworks governing Euro-Mediterranean relations. Instead, it is the 
Arab League, which participates as an observer ‘in all meetings at all levels’ of the Union for 
the Mediterranean,26 manifesting the split in EU policies towards Northern and Sub-Saharan 
Africa even further. 
                                               
15 Michal Ovádek and Jan Wouters, ‘Differentiation in Disguise? EU Instruments of Bilateral Cooperation in the 
Southern Neighbourhood’ (2017) Leuven Centre for Global Governance Working Paper Series, No 187, p. 5. 
16 Final Declaration of the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference of 27 and 28 November 1995, 
available at <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/bd_en.pdf> accessed 22 January 2018. 
17 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member 
States, of the one part, and the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, of the other part (adopted 22 April 2002, 
entry into force 1 September 2005) [2005] OJ L265/2; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association 
between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of 
the other part (adopted 25 June 2001, entry into force 1 June 2004) [2004] OJ L304/39; Euro-Mediterranean 
Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one 
part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part (adopted 26 February 1996, entry into force 1 March 2000) 
[2000] OJ L070/2; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part (adopted 17 
May 1995, entry into force 1 March 1998) [1998] OJ L97/2. 
18 Margot Wallström, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership’, Speech at 
the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly Plenary Session, Cairo, 14 March 2005, SPEECH/05/171. 
19 Paul James Cardwell, ‘EuroMed, European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean: 
Overlapping Policy Frames in the EU’s Governance of the Mediterranean’ (2011) 49(2) JCMS 219 (229). 
20 The Union for the Mediterranean includes not only the EU Member States and the former Barcelona Declaration 
partners, but also Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Mauritania, Monaco and Montenegro. Libya has an 
observer status; Syria has suspended its membership in December 2011. 
21 Ovádek and Wouters (n 15) 8. 
22 Anna-Luise Chané, Nora HoTu Nam, Magnus Killander, Tomasz Lewandowski, Remember Miamingi, Bright 
Nkrumah, ‘The EU’s engagement with regional multilateral organisations. Case study: African perspective’ (2015), 
FRAME Deliverable 5.4, p. 19, available at: <http://www.fp7-frame.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Deliverable-
5.4.pdf> accessed 22 January 2018. 
23 Nicholas Hutton ‘Africa’s changing relationship with the EEC’ (1974) 30(10) The World Today 426.  
24 Cotonou Partnership Agreement as amended in 2010 (n 10) art 6(b), 8, 11(1). 
25 Chané et al. (n 22) 20. 
26 Final Statement, 3-4 November 2008, <http://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/dec-final-
Marseille-UfM.pdf> accessed 22 January 2018. 
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The initial step towards a unified continent-to-continent approach was made with the first 
Africa-EU Summit in Cairo in April 2000. For the first time, EU and African states met under 
the aegis of the OAU and the EU in order to ‘give a new strategic dimension to the global 
partnership between Africa and Europe for the Twenty First Century, in a spirit of equality, 
respect, alliance and co-operation’.27 The Summit set out a comprehensive framework for 
political dialogue accompanied by an Action Plan focusing on five priority areas: (1) regional 
integration, (2) integrating Africa in the world economy, (3) human rights, democracy, good 
governance and the rule of law, (4) peace-building, conflict prevention, management and 
resolution, and (5) development. However, observers noted a disconnect of the respective 
agendas, with European representatives emphasizing political matters, and African 
representatives focusing on economic issues.28 Overall, the outcome of the Cairo Summit was 
considered too ‘timid’ and lacking a ‘credible operational structure’.29 But despite its 
weaknesses, the Summit laid the corner stone for a structured continent-wide political dialogue 
and the gradual convergence of interests. 
The changing regional and global environment led to a shift in the EU’s Africa Policy from 
humanitarianism to strategic partnership.30 One of the primary factors was the establishment 
of the AU, which replaced the OAU in 2002. It strengthened Africa’s institutional capacity to 
tackle the major challenges of the continent and signalled a sense of ownership for doing so. 
In addition, it increased Africa’s agency at the global level and provided the EU with an 
interlocutor with which it shared certain institutional features and policy priorities. On the 
European side, the launch of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the 
adoption of the first European Security Strategy (ESS) indicated Europe’s ambition to take on 
a more prominent role at the international level, while the new European Consensus on 
Development aimed to provide a common framework for EU development policy. At the same 
time, security concerns, demographic factors, competition for Africa’s natural resources and 
an increasing global focus on the eradication of poverty and inequality (as expressed e.g. in 
the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and most recently the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs)) have brought the importance of intercontinental cooperation 
between Europe and Africa into sharp focus. 
Against this background the EU adopted a Strategy for Africa in 2005,31 in order to provide a 
‘common, coordinated and coherent European initiative and response to the challenges Africa 
faces’.32 The EU-Africa Strategy was the first comprehensive EU policy framework that 
addressed Africa as a whole in line with the concept of ‘One Africa, one Europe’.33 It explicitly 
recognized the progress made in terms of regional integration in Africa and stressed the EU’s 
aim to strengthen its engagement with African multilateral institutions: 
‘While Africa has many faces, different histories and diverse needs, it has now collectively 
embarked on a path of political, economic and cultural integration of the entire continent, 
crystallised in the regional integration efforts promoted by Africa’s RECs and the launching 
of the AU and NEPAD. The EU Strategy for Africa will therefore, for the first time, address 
Africa as one entity. Under this Strategy, the EU will reinforce its dialogue with the pan 
African institutions.’34 
                                               
27 Africa-Europe Summit under the Aegis of the OAU and the EU, ‘Cairo Declaration’, Cairo, 3-4 April 2000, 
Conseil/00/901. 
28 ECDPM, ‘The EU-Africa Partnership in Historical Perspective’ (2006) Towards a Joint Africa-Europe Partnership 
Strategy – Issue Paper I, para 5; Carbone (n 9) 6; Rodt and Okeke (n 6) 217. 
29 Jack Mangala, ‘Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: Significance and Implications’ in Jack Mangala (ed), Africa and 
the European Union: A Strategic Partnership (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 4. 
30 Carbone (n 9) 6; ECDPM (n 28) para 6-7. 
31 European Commission, ‘EU Strategy for Europe: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa’s 
development’, 12 October 2005, COM(2005) 489 final. 
32 Ibid, p. 18. 
33 Ibid, p. 2. 
34 Ibid. 
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The Strategy identified a number of priority areas, where EU and EU Member States’ support 
should be strengthened, among these new issues, such as terrorism and migration. While the 
Strategy was lauded for its contribution towards a more consistent EU-Africa policy,35 African 
observers also criticized the lack of consultations36 and the fact that it represented a ‘too 
biased European priority agenda, which would not be conducive to creating African 
ownership’.37 Consequently, it was agreed at the 5th EU-Africa ministerial meeting in Bamako 
in December 2005, and later confirmed by the European Council in 2006 and the AU summit 
in January 2007, that both sides should work towards a joint strategy. 
This Joint EU-Africa Strategy (JAES) was finally adopted at the second EU-Africa Summit, 
held in Lisbon in December 2007, which brought together the heads of state or government of 
all EU and AU Member States and representatives of EU and AU institutions. For the first time 
in EU-Africa relations, both sides agreed on a common strategy to tackle common challenges. 
Based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and local ownership, it marked a 
‘watershed moment’ in the history of both regions and a final step away from the hierarchical 
donor-recipient relationships of the past towards a partnership of equals. The thematic scope 
and operational structure of the Partnership have been further amended at three subsequent 
summits (Tripoli 2010, Brussels 2014, Abidjan 2017).38 The JAES provides an overarching 
framework which does not replace but complements existing cooperation channels with Sub-
Saharan and Northern Africa.39 
3. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN AFRICA: THE AFRICAN UNION AND THE REGIONAL 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES 
By the end of the Second World War there were only four independent states in Africa: 
Ethiopia, Egypt, Liberia and South Africa. Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan gained independence 
in 1956 and Ghana in 1957. Many more states followed in the early 1960’s so that the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) brought together more than 30 independent African states 
when it was founded on 25 May 1963.40 Decolonization and an end to white minority rule in 
southern Africa were the highest priorities of the OAU. With the admission of democratic South 
Africa in 1994, the OAU had largely reached these goals. A few years later the continental 
organization reinvented itself as the AU which was officially launched in 2002.41 As at the end 
of 2017, the AU has 55 member states, including Morocco, which joined in 2017 after having 
left the OAU in 1984 due to the admission of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western 
Sahara) as an OAU member.  
The objectives of the AU include improved living standards, peace and security, democracy, 
human rights, and economic and political integration.42 The AU Constitutive Act, like the OAU 
Charter, also puts emphasis on solidarity and sovereignty. The AU aims at establishing an 
                                               
35 Carbone (n 9) 7. 
36 Fredrik Söderbaum, ‘The European Union as an actor in Africa: internal coherence and external legitimacy’ in 
Maurizio Carbone (ed.), The European Union in Africa: Incoherent policies, asymmetrical partnership, declining 
relevance? (Manchester University Press 2013) 25; Jack Mangala, ‘Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: Historical 
Background, Institutional Architecture, and Theoretical Frameworks’ in Jack Mangala (ed), Africa and the European 
Union: A Strategic Partnership (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 19. 
37 ECDPM (n 28) para 10. 
38 See also infra, section 5. 
39 European Commission, ‘Joint Africa-EU Strategy’, <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/continental-
cooperation/joint-africa-eu-strategy_en> accessed 22 January 2018. 
40 Charter of the Organization of African Unity (adopted 25 May 1963, entry into force 13 September 1963) 479 
UNTS 39. 
41 Constitutive Act of the African Union (adopted 11 July 2000, entry into force 26 May 2001) 2158 UNTS 3. The 
AU was launched in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa. 
42 Constitutive Act of the African Union (n 41) art 3. 
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African Economic Community (AEC) with a Pan-African Free Trade Area as a first stepping 
stone.43 
Parallel to the developments at the continental level a plethora of sub-regional organizations 
have been established. Eight of these have been recognized by the AU as building blocks 
towards the AEC. These Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are: 
 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 
 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 
 Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) 
 East African Community (EAC) 
 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
The RECs have similar objectives as the AU. However, the focus may vary in particular with 
regard to RECs with overlapping membership. Thus, the focus of IGAD is more on peace and 
security while the EAC and COMESA focus on economic integration. The EAC is the only 
REC which has established a customs union. Nevertheless, there are three other customs 
unions in Africa, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), the Central 
African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC) and the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU) formed by South Africa and its smaller neighbours Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. 
With regard to institutional structure, the AU and the RECs are dominated by the Assemblies 
of Heads of State and Government. The AU Assembly is the highest decision-making body of 
the organization, meeting twice a year for the AU Summit.44 It formulates the policies of the 
AU and decides on recommendations coming from other organs. The Assembly is assisted 
by the Executive Council, which consists of the Foreign Ministers (or other designated 
ministers) of the AU Member States and is tasked, inter alia, with preparing Assembly sessions 
and monitoring the implementation of policies adopted by the Assembly.45 A Permanent 
Representatives’ Committee, composed of the ambassadors to the AU prepares the work of 
the Executive Council46 and Specialized Technical Committees support the Executive Council 
in various thematic areas ranging from agriculture or trade to labour and culture.47 The AU 
Commission functions as the Secretariat of the Union.48 It is composed of a chairperson and 
a deputy, as well as eight Commissioners.49 The AU Commission is the ‘bureaucratic 
epicentre’50 of the AU, tasked with the implementation of the policies adopted by the Assembly. 
                                               
43 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (adopted 3 June 1991, entry into force 12 May 1994) 30 
ILM 1241. 
44 According to art 6(3) of the AU Constitutive Act (n 41) the Assembly must meet at least once a year in ordinary 
session. In 2004, the Assembly decided to increase the number of meetings to two ordinary sessions per year, see 
Assembly of the AU, ‘Decision on the Periodicity of the Ordinary Sessions of the Assembly, 6-8 July 2004, 
Assembly/AU/Dec.53 (III) Rev.1. For an overview of the institutional structure of the AU see African Union 
Commission and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, African Union Handbook 2017, available at 
<https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/31829-file-african-union-handbook-2017-edited.pdf> accessed 22 January 
2018. 
45 AU Constitutive Act (n 41) art 10-13. 
46 AU Constitutive Act (n 41) art 21(2). 
47 AU Constitutive Act (n 41) art 14-16. For a list of the Specialized Technical Committees see: AU, ‘The Specialized 
Technical Committees’, <https://au.int/en/organs/stc> accessed 22 January 2018. 
48 AU Constitutive Act (n 41) art 20. 
49 Their portfolios cover: (1) political affairs, (2) social affairs, (3) trade and industry, (4) economic affairs, (5) peace 
and security, (6) infrastructure and energy, (7) rural economy and agriculture, and (8) human resources, science 
and technology. 
50 Toni Haastrup, ‘EU as Mentor? Promoting Regionalism as External Relations Practice in EU-Africa Relations’ 
(2013) 35(7) Journal of European Integration 785 (789). 
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Regional parliaments are weakly developed with the possible exception of the East African 
Legislative Assembly, which has legislative powers, though legislation passed by it must be 
approved by all the presidents of the member states before it can enter into force.51 The Pan-
African Parliament (PAP) of the AU was created to ensure popular participation, but for the 
time being its members are elected indirectly and serve only in an advisory capacity.52 
Another advisory AU organ is the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, which is composed 
of civil society organizations from Africa and the diaspora.53 In addition, the AU has created a 
Peace and Security Council through a protocol adopted in 2002.54 Composed of 15 AU 
Member States on a rotational basis, the PSC serves as an ‘early warning’ mechanism to 
react to crisis situations across the continent. 
Finally, the AU has established the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to handle 
human rights cases. An African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which would include 
separate general affairs and human rights chambers, is set to be established once the Protocol 
establishing it has entered into force.55 However, so far only six states of the required 15 have 
ratified the Protocol which was adopted in 2008. A Protocol providing the Court with 
international criminal jurisdiction adopted in 2014 has not been ratified by any state.56 
Most of the RECs have judicial bodies, the most active being the ECOWAS Community Court 
of Justice, which is mainly limited to human rights cases, and the East African Court of Justice. 
A SADC Tribunal existed for a few years but was suspended in 2010 by the SADC Summit 
after Zimbabwe severely criticised a judgment handed down by the Tribunal against it.57 A 
Protocol to formally replace the original SADC Tribunal with a court with only inter-state access 
was adopted by the SADC Summit in 2014 but has not yet entered into force.58  
4. THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR EU COOPERATION WITH THE AFRICAN 
UNION AND THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES 
On the EU side, Article 220 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
provides that the Union shall maintain ‘relations as are appropriate with other international 
organisations’ and tasks the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy (HR/VP) and the Commission with the implementation of this Article, while Article 221(1) 
TFEU mandates the EU Delegations with the external representation of the Union. 
On the AU side, Executive Council decision 195(VII) of July 2005 lays out the criteria for 
granting observer status and accreditation of NGOs, non-African states, international 
organizations and regional integration organizations (such as the EU). In particular, accredited 
organizations need to be in conformity ‘with the spirit, objectives and principles of the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union’, ‘cooperate with and support the work of the African 
                                               
51 Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (adopted 30 November 1999, entry into force 7 July 
2000) art 62-63. 
52 See Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament 
(adopted 2 March 2001, entry into force 14 December 2003) arts 5, 11. See also Protocol to the Constitutive Act 
of the African Union Relating to the Pan-African Parliament (adopted 27 June 2014, not yet entered into force). 
53 AU Constitutive Act (n 41) art 22. 
54 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (adopted 9 July 
2002, entry into force 26 December 2003). 
55 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (adopted 1 July 2008, not yet entered 
into force) 16 IHRR 599. 
56 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(adopted 27 June 2014, not yet entered into force). 
57 Laurie Nathan, ‘The disbanding of the SADC Tribunal: A cautionary tale’ (2013) 35(4) Human Rights Quarterly 
870. 
58 Protocol on the Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community (adopted 18 August 2014, not yet 
entered into force). 
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Union’ and ‘promote knowledge of its principles and activities’. Accredited organizations may 
inter alia participate in open sessions of AU Conferences and upon invitation in other meetings 
of AU organs. They may have access to non-confidential AU documents within their fields of 
interest, and – if authorized by the Chairperson of a meeting – make statements and reply to 
questions directed at them. The European Union has obtained accreditation, as have all EU 
Member States.59 
In January 2008, the EU opened a Delegation to the African Union, based in Addis Ababa, in 
order to have a permanent presence on the ground. It represents the EU vis-a-vis the AU 
bodies and coordinates with the EU Member States. At headquarters level, the Division for 
Pan-African Affairs is responsible for EU-AU relations and the EU-AU strategic partnership. In 
the Council, the Africa Working Party (COAFR) prepares the Council’s work concerning the 
EU’s relations with the AU and sub-regional organizations. Both, the European Commission 
and the European Parliament actively engage with their African counterparts. The European 
Commission meets the AU Commission in annual College-to-College sessions; the European 
Parliament has repeatedly addressed issues pertaining to Africa or EU-African relations in its 
resolutions and there have been official visits of Parliamentarians in the past. Finally, at the 
same time as the adoption of the JAES, the Council of the EU appointed a Special 
Representative to the AU, tasked inter alia with strengthening the EU’s political dialogue and 
relationship with the AU and contributing to the implementation of the JAES.60 The mandate 
of the Special Representative was subsequently extended several times until 2014. 
The EU also has Delegations accredited to the different RECs. For example, the EU 
Delegation to Nigeria is accredited to ECOWAS, the EU Delegation to Tanzania represents 
the EU vis-à-vis the EAC, the EU Delegation to Gabon represents the EU in ECCAS and the 
EU Delegation to Zambia in COMESA, the EU Delegation to Djibouti is accredited to IGAD, 
and the EU Delegation to Botswana represents the EU vis-à-vis SADC.  
5. THE JOINT AFRICA-EU STRATEGY 
The JAES forms the backbone of the EU relationship with Africa. It provides a long-term 
framework for cooperation in jointly identified priority areas. By placing the European and 
African partners on equal footing, the JAES opens a new chapter in EU-Africa relations, 
ostensibly moving away from the traditional donor-recipient hierarchy that characterized the 
intercontinental relations in the previous decades. In a novel approach, the JAES aims to go 
‘beyond development cooperation, beyond Africa, beyond fragmentation and beyond 
institutions’,61 by broadening the scope of the strategic partnership to include political matters 
of common concern, by addressing not only African but also global challenges, by supporting 
African regional integration, and by opening up the range of involved actors to include civil 
society and other stakeholders.  
Other than in previous contractual frameworks, the AU and the RECs are an integral part of 
the JAES. The Strategy recognizes the AU as a ‘natural interlocutor for the EU on continental 
issues and as the most important institutional partner for the EU’.62 RECs are considered as 
‘important for the continental economic and political integration agenda’ which ‘should 
continue to be key partners for the EU in Africa’.63 The institutional architecture, created by 
                                               
59 AU, ‘Non-African States and Organisations accredited to the AU’, available at <https://au.int/en/organs/Non-
African-States> accessed 22 January 2018. 
60 Council Joint Action 2007/805/CFSP of 6 December 2007 appointing a European Union Special Representative 
to the African Union [2007] OJ L 323/45. 
61 European Commission, ‘From Cairo to Lisbon – The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership’, Brussels, 27 June 2007, 
COM(2007) 357 final. 
62 Council of the EU, ‘The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy’, Lisbon, 9 December 2007, 
16344/07 (Presse 291) [JAES] para 98. 
63 JAES (n 62) para 99. 
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the JAES, reflects this: the presidencies of the AU and the AU Commission participate in the 
high-level dialogue, the AU Commission regularly meets with its European counterpart in 
College-to-College meetings, and the AU Political and Security Council, as well as the Pan-
African Parliament cooperate with their EU counterparts. 
The JAES is operationalized through a series of consecutive Action Plans. The first Action 
Plan identified eight thematic areas for partnership: 
(1) peace and security,  
(2) democracy and human rights,  
(3) trade and regional integration,  
(4) MDGs,  
(5) energy,  
(6) climate change,  
(7) migration, mobility and employment,  
(8) science, information society and space.  
Both sides also agreed on strengthening the political dialogue through an increase of high-
level meetings, ministerial meetings and closer engagement between the respective 
parliamentary bodies.  
A second Action Plan for the period 2011-2013 was adopted at the Tripoli Summit in 
November 2010, which, while maintaining the eight previous thematic partnerships, 
considerably expanded the number of priority actions per partnership. This attracted criticism, 
with observers noting the lack of focus of the JAES, leading to ‘fatigue and frustration’ of those 
involved.64  
Calls for a stronger prioritization were heeded with the adoption of the Roadmap 2014-2017 
at the 4th EU-Africa Summit in Brussels. The Roadmap identified five priority areas:  
(1) peace and security,  
(2) democracy, good governance and human rights,  
(3) human development,  
(4) sustainable and inclusive development and growth and continental integration  
(5) global and emerging issues.  
In parallel, the EU established the Pan-African Programme, which serves as one of the main 
financial instruments for the implementation of the JAES and, as the first EU development 
cooperation program which covers the entire African continent, has been allocated a budget 
of €845 million for the period 2014-2020.65 
The most recent summit, held in November 2017 in Abidjan, was convened under the theme 
of ‘Investing in youth for a sustainable future’. The adopted Joint Declaration sets out common 
priorities with regard to economic opportunities for youth, peace and security, mobility and 
migration and governance.66 All of the ‘common priorities’ could be viewed as being related to 
‘root causes of irregular migration’ as referred to in the Declaration.67 This focus is in line with 
the EU’s aim of slowing the tide of migration from Africa to the EU and the related humanitarian 
catastrophe in Libya and in the Mediterranean.  
                                               
64 Mehari Taddele Maru and Emebet G. Abate, ‘Towards Africa-EU Brussels Summit: Dialogue and Capacity for 
Delivery’ (Africa-Europe Relations, 10 January 2014) <www.africa-eu.com/2014/01/towards-africa-eu-brussels-
summit.html> accessed 22 January 2018. See also Rein (n 1) 561. 
65 See for more detail infra, section 6.3. 
66 Joint declaration of 5th African Union-European Union Summit, ‘Investing in Youth for Accelerated Inclusive 
Growth and Sustainable Development’, AU-EU/Decl.1(V), 30 November 2017. 
67 Ibid, para 10. 
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6. TOOLS FOR COOPERATION 
6.1. DIALOGUE 
The top-level forum for dialogue is the Africa-EU summit (in 2017 renamed the AU-EU 
summit),68 which is held approximately every three years, alternately in the EU and in Africa. 
The summits convene the heads of state or government of the EU and AU member states as 
well as AU and EU representatives. They decide on the political direction and the priorities of 
the partnership and set the agenda for the coming years through the adoption of declarations, 
action plans and roadmaps. 
Apart from the summits, meetings occur at ministerial (foreign and sectoral) and senior officials 
level, held ad hoc in order to review and monitor progress. In addition, the EU Political and 
Security Committee and the AU Peace and Security Council organise annual joint meetings 
in Brussels and in Addis Ababa, which serve to exchange views on peace and security topics, 
e.g. AU peace support operations.69  
The ‘driving forces behind the partnership’70 are the two Commissions, which are tasked with 
developing the political agenda. The two colleges of Commissioners meet annually at college-
to-college meetings (C2C) which were initially assisted by a Joint AU-EU Task Force, 
composed of staff from the two Commissions and the European Council Secretariat. In 2014, 
the Joint Task Force was replaced by a Joint Annual Forum (JAF), which is supposed to 
convene sectoral experts from the EU and AU Member States and institutions, civil society 
and other stakeholders to follow up on the implementation of the JAES. However, 
disagreements about its composition have so far prevented the JAF from becoming 
operational.71 Finally, high-level dialogues and expert level meetings are held on particular 
themes such as infrastructure and science, technology and innovation.72  
The EU Delegation to the African Union is responsible for the day-to-day contacts between 
the two organizations and plays the ‘most crucial role’73 in the implementation of the 
partnership due to its proximity to and direct contacts with African institutions and 
stakeholders. On the other hand, the AU’s Permanent Mission to the European Union in 
Brussels has reportedly faced ‘difficulties in asserting itself as a key player in the process’.74 
Observers have also noted limited engagement of AU Member States and RECs in the 
partnership.75 
The EU holds dialogue with the AU on various topics. Sometimes other intergovernmental 
organizations also participate. Thus, the Task Force on migration resulted from the EU-AU 
Summit in Abidjan in November 2017 and includes also UN agencies, in particular IOM and 
                                               
68 The name change is probably in light of the AU representing all of Africa after Morocco joined in 2017. For 
alternative explanations see Frank Mattheis and John Kotsopoulos, ‘The EU-Africa summit is now the AU-EU 
summit. Why the upgrade matters’, The Conversation, 4 December 2017, <http://theconversation.com/the-eu-
africa-summit-is-now-the-au-eu-summit-why-the-upgrade-matters-88185> accessed 22 January 2018. 
69 Nicoletta Pirozzi, Nicolo Sartori and Bernardo Venturi, ‘The Joint Africa-EU Strategy’ (2017) Study prepared for 
the European Parliament, Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies, 
EP/EXPO/B/DEVE/FWC/2013-08/Lot5/17, p. 13. 
70 JAES (n 62) para 103. 
71 Ibid. 
72 European Commission, ‘Africa-EU Dialogue’, <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/continental-
cooperation/africa-eu-dialogue_en> accessed 22 January 2018. 
73 Rein (n 1) 563. 
74 Mangala, ‘Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: Historical Background, Institutional Architecture, and Theoretical 
Frameworks’ (n 36) 33. 
75 Ibid. 
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UNHCR.76 In fact, while the role of the EU (financing and resettlement), IOM (transport to 
home countries) and UNHCR (status determination) is clear, the role of the AU is less so, 
though it will seemingly play are role – together with its member states – in ensuring that 
migrants are returned to their home states.  
The EU also holds a yearly human rights dialogue with the AU. The human rights dialogue 
started as a technical meeting in 2008 but is now held at a political level and since the 9th 
dialogue also includes representatives of the AU human rights bodies.77  
The EU furthermore participates with the AU, UN and RECs in efforts to secure peace in 
various conflict situations across the African continent, for example in Guinea-Bissau78 and 
Libya,79 and holds dialogues with the AU and the RECs on peace and security in Africa. The 
EU also organizes informal meetings, including with RECs and member state representatives. 
For example, the HR/VP met with representatives of IGAD and its member states in 
September 2017 to discuss ‘security, stability and prosperity of the Horn of Africa ranging from 
protracted conflicts and transnational crime to irregular migration and poor economic 
development.’80 
6.2. TRADE AND INVESTMENT  
Since their independence, African states have traded preferentially with the EU. However, 
under rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), only least developed countries (LDCs) 
are allowed such preferential treatment.81 The EU has therefore negotiated Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with African states. Given the overlapping membership of 
RECs, the negotiations are done in country groupings that are somewhat different from the 
RECs. 
The Cotonou Partnership Agreement will be replaced by a new agreement when it expires 
and negotiation of a new agreement will soon start. The EU Commission and the HR/VP jointly 
published a consultation paper entitled ‘Towards a new partnership between the European 
Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries after 2020’ in October 2015.82 The AU 
is set to adopt a Post-2020 Cotonou Common African Position by January 2018. Given that 
EPAs cover both trade and development cooperation and since the political elements of the 
                                               
76 European External Action Service, ‘Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini 
following the meeting at political level of the European Union-African Union-United Nations-Task Force’, 14 
December 2017, <https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/african-union-au/37424/remarks-federica-mogherini-
following-meeting-political-level-european-union-african-union_en> accessed 22 January 2018. 
77 For a discussion on the human rights dialogue see Chané et al (n 22) 26 et seq. 
78 Delegation of the European Union to the African Union, ‘Press release from P5 – AU, ECOWAS, CPLP, EU and 
UN – in Bissau’, 16 November 2017, <https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/african-union-au/35703/press-release-
p5-au-ecowas-cplp-eu-and-un-bissau_en> accessed 22 January 2018. 
79 Delegation of the European Union to the African Union, ‘Meeting of the Libya Quartet: Joint Communiqué’, 23 
May 2017, <https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/african-union-au/26764/meeting-libya-quartet-joint-
communiqu%C3%A9_en> accessed 22 January 2018. 
80 Delegation of the European Union to the African Union, ‘Joint press release by the EU and IGAD on the Informal 
Ministerial Meeting with Foreign Ministers from IGAD member countries’, 29 September 2017, 
<https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/african-union-au/33065/joint-press-release-eu-and-igad-informal-ministerial-
meeting-foreign-ministers-igad-member_en> accessed 22 January 2018. For more details on political dialogue 
with RECs see Chané et al (n 22), pp. 37 et seq. 
81 CEPII-CIREM, ‘An impact study of the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) in the six ACP 
Regions’, Final report, January 2008, <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/march/tradoc_138081.pdf> 
accessed 22 January 2018, p 38. See also James Thuo Gathii, ‘The Cotonou Agreement and economic partnership 
agreements’ in United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (ed), Realizing the right to 
development – Essays in commemoration of 25 years of the United Nations Declaration on the Right to 
Development (United Nations, 2013) 259. 
82 European Commission, HR/VP, ‘Towards a new partnership between the European Union and the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries after 2020’, Joint Consultation Paper, Strasbourg, 6 October 2015, JOIN(2015) 
33 final. 
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Cotonou Partnership Agreement (including the possibility to impose sanctions) remain 
controversial, it is unclear exactly what will be covered in a post-2020 Agreement. However, it 
should be noted that EPA negotiations have been very slow and that no full EPA in sub-
Saharan Africa has taken effect. A contributing factor to this is that many sub-Saharan African 
states are LDCs and thus see little benefit from agreeing to EPAs which would eventually force 
them to open up to a free inflow of EU goods.  
The EU signed an EPA with the SADC EPA group (Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland) in 2016. Angola who was a member of the negotiating 
group did not sign but can join later.83 Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Madagascar and 
Seychelles are members of SADC but have negotiated as part of the Eastern and Southern 
Africa group (ESA) which also includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan. However, the 
EU has only concluded an interim EPA with four of these states (Zimbabwe, Mauritius, 
Madagascar and Seychelles) in 2009.84 
The EAC member states concluded an EPA with the EU in 2014, though negotiations are 
continuing on some aspects and the EPA has only been ratified by Kenya and signed by 
Rwanda.85  
In West Africa, an EPA has been initialled with 16 states, ECOWAS and UEMOA. Further 
stepping stone agreements have been concluded with Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana in 2016 
pending the conclusion of a final EPA.86 Negotiations are still ongoing on an EPA with the 
Central African Region. However, Cameroon signed an interim EPA with the EU in 2009.87 
The West African EPA is the only one which includes not only African states but also ECOWAS 
and UEMOA as organizations, similarly to the EU which is included in all the EPAs as a 
separate signatory in addition to its member states. This is in line with the wish of the West 
Africa to negotiate as one region, though the bloc includes one member, Mauritania, which is 
not an ECOWAS member. 
There has been much criticism of the potential negative impact of EPAs. For example, the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) is reported to have noted that ‘[i]f 
the EAC-EU EPA is fully implemented, the region risks losing trading opportunities with other 
partners, industrial output, welfare and GDP’.88 
6.3. FINANCING 
The main instrument for development assistance under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement 
is the European Development Fund (EDF). The total amount allocated for the 11th EDF, 2014-
2020, is €30.5 billion. This support is provided to African, Caribbean and Pacific states based 
                                               
83 European Commission, ‘Southern African Development Community (SADC)’, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/sadc/> accessed 22 January 2018. 
84 European Commission, ‘Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA)’, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/regions/esa/> accessed 22 January 2018. 
85 European Commission, ‘East African Community (EAC)’, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/regions/eac/> accessed 22 January 2018. 
86 European Commission, ‘West Africa’, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/west-
africa/> accessed 22 January 2018; European Parliament, ‘Legislative Train Schedule: A Balanced and 
Progressive Trade Policy to Harness Globalization – Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with West Africa’, 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-balanced-and-progressive-trade-policy-to-harness-
globalisation/file-epa-with-west-africa> accessed 22 January 2018. 
87 European Commission, ‘Central Africa’, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/central-
africa/> accessed 22 January 2018. 
88 Ivan R. Mugisha, ‘UN body warns region against signing trade deal with EU’, The East African, 22 April 2017, 
<www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/UNECA-warns-region-against-signing-trade-deal-with-EU-/2560-3899102-
khlebgz/index.html> accessed 22 January 2018. 
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on National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) and to intergovernmental organizations based on 
Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs). 
The EU has three Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs) (2014-2020) for Africa: one for West 
Africa, one for Central Africa and one for Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean 
(EA-SA-IO). The EDF also includes NIPs for all sub-Saharan African states except South 
Africa. 
The West Africa RIP providing guidelines for €1.15 billion of support over the seven-year 
period was adopted jointly by the EU Commissioner for International Cooperation and 
Development and the chairpersons of the ECOWAS and UEMOA commissions. The West 
Africa RIP like the West Africa EPA covers the 15 member states of ECOWAS plus Mauritania. 
EU support to ECOWAS includes a 2013 grant of €8.9 million for institutional reform and 
capacity strengthening of the ECOWAS Commission based on ‘[s]everal assessments, 
evaluations and audits conducted over the last 5 years [which] have pointed to the lack of 
compliance by ECOWAS with international standards on financial and administrative 
management’.89 Other financial support includes €16.5 million to fight drugs and organised 
crime in the sub-region in line with ECOWAS Regional Action Plan.90 
The Central Africa RIP providing guidelines for €350 million of support for the 2014-2020 
period was adopted jointly by the EU Commissioner for International Cooperation and 
Development and the chairperson of the CEMAC Commission and the Secretary-General of 
ECCAS. 
The RIP for the EA-SA-IO region was adopted jointly by the EU Commissioner for International 
Cooperation and Development and the Secretary Generals of COMESA and EAC and the 
Executive Secretaries of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and SADC. The EA-SA-IO RIP 
provides guidelines for provision of €1.3 billion of support over the seven-year period. The EA-
SA-IO covers all the member states of the intergovernmental organizations except South 
Africa.  
In line with the overlap in membership of RECs, the RIPs also overlap. Thus, for example 
Burundi, DRC and Rwanda are covered by both the Central Africa and the EA-SA-IO RIPs. 
In addition to the RIPs the EU in 2014 established the Pan-African Programme as a financial 
instrument for implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. The Pan-African Programme is 
financed from the EU’s Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) with a financial envelope 
of €845 million for 2014-2020.91  
The Pan-African Programme covers support to national institutions, RECs and the AU and 
other international organizations such as the African Legal Support Facility which provides 
legal support to states in relation to complex commercial agreements such as related to the 
extractive industry.92 For example, with regard to customs reform and modernization, which is 
seen by the EU as both contributing to the realization of an African Free Trade Area and 
implementation of EPAs, the EU will provide support to the AU and RECs to ‘develop, 
                                               
89 European Commission, ‘EU support for the Economic Community of West African States’, Press Release, 22 
July 2013, <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/aap-public-finance-ecowas-press-release-
20130722_en.pdf> accessed 22 January 2018. 
90 Delegation of the European Union to Nigeria, Abuja, ‘New EU support to fight drugs and organised crime in West 
Africa’, 29 July 2013, <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/aap-drug-ecowas-press-release-
20130729_en.pdf> accessed 22 January 2018. 
91 European Commission, ‘Pan-African Programme’, <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/continental-
cooperation/pan-african-programme_en> accessed 22 January 2018. 
92 African Legal Support Facility, <www.aflsf.org> accessed 22 January 2018; European Commission, ‘Annex 2 of 
the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2017 of the DCI Pan-African 
Programme, Action Document for EU contribution to the African Legal Support Facility’, 
<https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/pan-africa-programme-2017-annexe-2_en.pdf> accessed 22 
January 2018. 
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implement and manage continental and regional classification aspects of their preferential 
regimes’ and to enhance the capacity of national customs administrations’.93 It should be noted 
that no preferential regime exists yet at the continental level. Direct support to the AU 
Commission includes support for policy and regulation in relation to ICT,94 livestock 
management,95 and support for institutions involved in human rights and democratisation.96 
Many projects are implemented through grants awarded through calls for proposals.97 
The need for African ownership is often highlighted. Thus, for example with regard to support 
to livestock management the EU Commission notes:98 
In light of the Aid Effectiveness agenda, in particular to ensure ownership and alignment, 
the organisational set-up and responsibilities will be as follows: AU-IBAR will be in 
charge of the overall coordination of the continental Live2Africa programme and will 
implement the activities either directly or through third parties, in particular the RECs 
and AU MS, in line with the mandate of the AUC and the LiDeSA. AU-IBAR will establish 
a programme management team in Nairobi, Kenya and strengthen its internal team with 
1 project officer and 6 thematic experts (as per budget). This technical staff will play an 
advisory role on capacity building and other relevant aspects of the programme. 
Coordination within the EU and with membership initiatives is important. For example, with 
regard to support to the AU human rights institutions under the Pan-African Programme, the 
EU Commission notes:99  
This project is also complementary to other currently on-going actions supported by the 
EU such as the African Union Support Programme II (current support to the AUC and 
AU organs) financed under the Intra-ACP 10th EDF and initiatives supported under the 
JAES Support Mechanism and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights for the implementation of the EU-AU Human Rights Dialogue decisions (i.e. 
support to ACHPR special rapporteur; support to the continental conference on death 
penalty; support to the freedom of association and assembly working group and specific 
programme supporting civil society action with a pan-African scope addressing AU 
human rights bodies). Other complementary action includes EIDHR (European 
Instrument Democracy and Human Rights) support to National Human Rights 
Institutions including their international and regional networks and support to the pan-
African Network of Human Rights Defenders.  
                                               
93 European Commission, ‘Annex 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 
2017 of the DCI Pan-African Programme, Action Document for “Classifying goods for African trade”’, 
<https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/pan-africa-programme-annexe-1_enpdf.pdf> accessed 22 
January 2018. 
94 European Commission, ‘Annex 4 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 
2017 of the DCI Pan-African Programme, Action Document for Policy and Regulation Initiative for Digital Africa 
(PRIDA)’, <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/pan-africa-programme-annexe-4_en.pdf> accessed 
22 January 2018. 
95 European Commission, ‘Annex 2 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the on the Annual Action 
Programme 2016 of the DCI Pan-African Programme, Action Document for “LIVE2AFRICA: Pan-African Support 
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97 See eg European Commission, ‘Annex 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action 
Programme 2016 of the DCI Pan-African Programme, Action Document for “Intra-Africa Academic Mobility Scheme 
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The EU has supported the AU human rights institutions since 2006 through the AU Support 
Programme. However, despite support totalling €55 million, there are still many challenges. 
Not all of these can be addressed through financial assistance. Thus, the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) in 2017 set out in its Activity Report that ‘[t]he 
ACHPR has experienced an unprecedented leadership crisis at its Secretariat, which if not 
urgently addressed will render it completely dysfunctional.’100  
The African Peace Facility was established under the EDF in 2004 and has so far committed 
more than €2.7 billion to support peace and security initiatives by the AU and RECs. The 
highest cost is in relation to allowances for troops deployed in AMISOM, the AU’s 
peacekeeping force in Somalia. As of 2016, the cost for this for the EU was around €20 million 
per month. The money is paid out to the AU for distribution to troop contributing countries.101 
Some AU member states are critical of the EU’s reduction of allowances to troops and delays 
in the payment. There are also challenges in relation to payment of the Burundian contingent 
due to EU sanctions against Burundi.102 The budget of AMISOM is included in the AU budget 
and the total budget of close to 336 million USD for 2017 is covered by donors.103 The cost for 
AMISOM is 43 per cent of the total budget of the AU. 
7. OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 
The EU puts much emphasis on dialogue. Inclusiveness and transparency is important for any 
dialogue to be successful. The July 2017 Africa-EU Civil Society Forum Declaration adopted 
ahead of the 5th AU-EU Summit noted that ‘the space for CSOs has shrunk’ and that previous 
action points have not been followed through.104 It is particularly regrettable that the Joint 
Annual Forum, which was intended to facilitate civil society participation, has not yet been 
convened. This is concerning in an environment where civil society space has shrunk in many 
African states and where regional institutions that seek to promote such space, such as the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, remain weak.  
The EPAs are very controversial among most African states and the majority of those who 
have signed on have done so simply because, as non-LDCs, they would otherwise risk losing 
tariff free access to the European market. It is noticeable that only West Africa has fully 
negotiated as a bloc and included the REC, ECOWAS, as a party to the agreement. The EU 
has recognized that African states are often at a disadvantage in negotiating complex 
commercial agreements with the private sector, for example in relation to the extractive 
industry. Thus, as noted above, the EU has provided financial support to the African Legal 
Support Facility. The EU has, however, not been keen to recognize that the same forces are 
at play in EPA negotiations and that much of the negative sentiment around the EPAs are 
flowing from this.  
The AU and RECs remain heavily dependent on donors, in particular the EU and its member 
states. However, it should be noted that the EU is hardly altruistic in its support as most support 
goes towards trade liberalization, peace and security measures and measures to provide 
opportunities for Africans who might otherwise decide to attempt to migrate to Europe. The 
EU’s interest in promoting exports from the EU and preventing migration from Africa to the EU 
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19 
 
is clearly evident in many interventions. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was 
established in 2015 ‘[d]ue to ongoing unprecedented levels of irregular migration’ to support 
the ‘most fragile’ states.105 With funding of over €3 billion, the Trust Fund covers interventions 
aimed at preventing migration from African states with high migration to Europe rather than 
states which would fall under a general definition of fragile. 
It must also be noted that in particular donor funding of international organizations in Africa 
remains controversial on the continent itself. Both AU organs, such as the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the AU political bodies, such as the Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government and the Executive Council have expressed concern over 
dependence on donor funds, in particular in relation to ‘sensitive’ areas such as human 
rights.106 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
EU-Africa relations have undergone a remarkable transformation over the past sixty years, 
from the colonial era to a ‘partnership of equals’. As African states gained independence, the 
EU developed a number of different frameworks for its trade, aid, and later political cooperation 
with African partners, resulting in the fragmentation of EU-Africa relations. The adoption of the 
JAES in 2007, however, has laid the foundation for a strategic partnership between both 
continents, complementing and adding value to the existing frameworks. Despite significant 
progress made in terms of regional integration and cooperation, challenges remain. In 
particular, despite a sometimes observed gradual convergence of interests on the EU and the 
AU side, positions on a range of crucial issues, for example international criminal justice, 
diverge sharply. Lack of high-level dialogue on these topics and lack of visionary leadership 
are among the most frequently observed challenges. Furthermore, although the JAES aims to 
go ‘beyond institutions’, civil society participation is still insufficient. Convening the Joint 
Annual Forum, as agreed at the Brussels Summit in 2014, would facilitate engagement with 
civil society and other stakeholders. Finally, although the EU is the biggest donor of 
development aid in Africa, the fragmentation of its funding schemes, and the continued 
dependence of AU and RECs institutions on donor funding, remain problematic. The AU and 
the EU have entered uncharted territory with the JAES, pioneering an intercontinental and 
multilateral strategic partnership. However, the practical implementation of the far-reaching 
commitments remains very much a work in progress. 
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